

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 084661 TOSEC 030176
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/SE:GWCHAPMAN:LB

APPROVED BY EUR:REBARBOUR

EUR/SE:RCEWING

S/S-O:SRPVALERGA

-----079367 012010Z /70

O 011940Z APR 78 ZFF6

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE

USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 084661 TOSEC 030176

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGOV, PEPR, CY

SUBJECT:BRIEFING OF CYPRIOT AMBASSADOR ON EASTERN MEDITER-
RANEAN POLICY DECISIONS

REF: BONN 5705

1. EUR DEPASSTSEC BARBOUR CALLED IN CYPRUS AMBASSADOR
MORNING OF APRIL 1 TO BRIEF HIM, ALONG LINES OF REFTTEL,
ON ADMINISTRATION DECISIONS REGARDING EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.
BEFORE DESCRIBING FOUR-POINT PROGRAM, BARBOUR NOTED THAT
ADMINISTRATION HAD BEEN ENGAGED FOR SOME MONTHS IN GENERAL
REVIEW OF OUR EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN POLICY, AND THAT OUR
PRESENT DECISION SHOULD BE SEEN AS A CULMINATION OF THIS
PROCESS RATHER THAN AS A HASTY AND PERHAPS INTEMPERATE
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REACTION TO WHAT THE PRESS SAW AS TURKISH THREATS OR BLACK-
MAIL. THE SEEMING SUDDENNESS OF DEPUTY SECRETARY'S DEPAR-
TURE FOR ANKARA RESULTED ONLY FROM THE FACT THAT A PRESID-
ENTIAL DECISION HAD BEEN REACHED.

2. IN EXPLAINING THE FOUR-POINT PROGRAM, DEPTOFF EMPHASIZED
THAT OUR DECISION NOT TO PRESS AHEAD WITH THE DCA MEANT

THAT THERE WAS NOW NO MULTI-YEAR DOLS 1 BILLION COMMITMENT AND THAT TURKEY WOULD RECEIVE NO GRANT AID IN THE FORTH-COMING FISCAL YEAR. WHILE CONVEYING OUR BELIEF THAT 620(X) HAS OUTLIVED ITS USEFULNESS, BARBOUR DREW ATTENTION TO THE

FACT THAT ITS REPEAL WOULD HAVE LIMITED PRACTICAL EFFECT ON TURKISH MILITARY STRENGTH. THERE WERE STILL CERTAIN ITEMS IN THE PIPELINE FROM 1974, BUT AS WAS WELL KNOWN THE TURKS COULD NOT AFFORD TO MAKE ANY SUBSTANTIAL CASH PURCHASES AND OUR RECOMMENDED FMS LEVEL FOR FY 1979 WOULD BE THE SAME AS THE ADMINISTRATION HAD PROPOSED EARLIER. DEPT-OFF STRESSED OUR BELIEF THAT REPEAL OF 620(X)--AND THE PACKAGE AS A WHOLE--WOULD ENABLE US TO BE SUPPORTIVE OF POSITIVE TRENDS IN PRESENT TURKISH POLICY AND TO CONTINUE TO BE HELPFUL WITH RESPECT TO CYPRUS. HE EMPHASIZED THE ADMINISTRATION'S FIRM INTENTION TO REMAIN ACTIVELY COMMITTED TO SEEKING A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT.

3. BARBOUR SAID THAT WE RECOGNIZED THAT CERTAIN ELEMENTS IN CYPRUS MIGHT SEIZE UPON THE ADMINISTRATION'S DECISION TO MAKE TROUBLE. EXPERIENCE TOLD US, HOWEVER, THAT THE GOC COULD DO A LOT TO DAMPEN NEGATIVE REACTIONS AND TO ENCOURAGE A MORE RESPONSIBLE ATTITUDE. WE HOPED THAT WE COULD COUNT ON THE GOC TO DO WHAT IT COULD IN THE DAYS AND WEEKS AHEAD. BARBOUR NOTED THAT AMBASSADOR MCCLOSKEY HAD ALREADY OUTLINED THE ADMINISTRATION'S DECISION TO

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ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER AVEROFF, AND THAT AVEROFF'S REACTION, WHILE SOBER, HAD BEEN MEASURED.

4. DIMITRIOU SAID THAT HE HAD SPOKEN EARLY THAT MORNING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ROLANDIS, AND HAD SUMMARIZED FOR HIM ADMINISTRATION POSITION AS HE ANTICIPATED IT. ROLANDIS HAD INSTRUCTED HIM TO EXPRESS THE GOC'S DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE DECISION TO SEEK REPEAL OF 620(X), WHICH WOULD CLEARLY NOT BE CONDUCIVE TO THE GOT ADOPTING A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH TOWARDS RENEWED INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS. SINCE THE REASONS FOR ITS IMPOSITION HAD NOT BEEN REMOVED, THE GOC SAW NO JUSTIFICATION IN LIFTING THE "EMBARGO." DIMITRIOU STRESSED GOC VIEW THAT 620(X) HAD NEVER BEEN GIVEN A FAIR CHANCE; STATEMENTS SUCH AS THOSE OF FORMER PRESIDENT FORD DESCRIBING THE "EMBARGO" AS A NATIONAL DISASTER HAD ENCOURAGED THE TURKS TO BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD SOON BE LIFTED AND HAD FORTIFIED THEIR INTRANSIGENCE. DIMITRIOU POINTED TO THE STRONG FAITH THAT THE CYPRIOTS HAD PLACED IN PRESIDENT CARTER'S CAMPAIGN PROMISES AND IN HIS ASSURANCES TO KYPRIANOU LAST OCTOBER THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD STAND BY THE "EMBARGO." THIS UNEXPECTED VOLTE-FACE WAS HENCE AS SURPRISING AS IT WAS DISAPPOINTING TO THE GOC.

5. DIMITRIOU SAID THAT HE DID NOT DOUBT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD RETAIN ITS COMMITMENT TO FOSTERING A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT, AND HE TOOK NOTE OF THE U.S. BELIEF THAT THE GOC WAS APPROACHING THE PROBLEM SERIOUSLY. BARBOUR INTER-

JECTED THAT, ON THE BASIS OF OUR CONVERSATIONS IN ANKARA, WE CONTINUED TO BE ENCOURAGED REGARDING TURKEY'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE CYPRUS ISSUE. WE DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE TURKISH/TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS WOULD EVEN BE MADE PUBLIC SOON. SHOULD THEY IN FACT GO PUBLIC, THIS COULD BE TAKEN AS A SIGN OF CONFIDENCE THAT THE PROPOSALS DESERVED TO BE WELL RECEIVED.

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6. DIMITRIOU ASKED A NUMBER OF FACTUAL QUESTIONS ON THE FOUR-POINT PROGRAM--FMS CREDITS TO TURKEY, INCREASED ASSISTANCE TO GREECE, MAGNITUDE OF PIPELINE, TERMS OF SSA LOAN, ETC.--WHICH DEPTOFF ANSWERED ON BASIS REFTEL. DIMITRIOU THEN STRESSED AGAIN GOC SURPRISE AS WELL AS DISAPPOINTMENT AT OUR DECISION. AT HIS MEETING WITH KYPRIANOU IN OCTOBER, THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN VERY OUTSPOKEN ON THE SUBJECT OF LINKAGE, AND THE SECRETARY HAD RECENTLY TOLD BOTH MICHAELIDES AND DIMITRIOU THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY AND THAT ANY DECISION WOULD BE DEPENDENT ON THE NEW TURKISH PROPOSALS. A DECISION PRIOR TO PRESENTATION OF THOSE PROPOSALS THEREFORE CAME AS A SUDDEN BLOW. DIMITRIOU SAID THAT THE SENSE OF CYPRIOT DISAPPOINTMENT WOULD BE PROPORTIONATE TO THE TRUST THAT HAD BEEN PLACED IN THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION FROM AN EARLY DATE, ESPECIALLY IN ITS EMPHASIS ON THE MORAL ASPECT OF FOREIGN POLICY. THIS FEELING OF HAVING BEEN LET DOWN WOULD LEAD TO A STRONG REACTION IN BOTH CYPRUS AND GREECE, WHICH HE FEARED WOULD NOT BE CALM AND COMPOSED. DIMITRIOU NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE GOC WOULD CONTINUE TO SEEK TO STRENGTHEN THE BONDS BETWEEN CYPRUS AND THE U.S.

7. IN RESPONSE BARBOUR SAID THAT THERE WAS IN FACT NO INCONSISTENCY IN OUR POLICY. WE HAD SAID ALL ALONG THAT OUR DECISION ON THE DCA WOULD INTER ALIA TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE SITUATION IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, I.E. THE TURKISH PROPOSALS; THESE PROPOSALS HAD NOT THUS FAR BEEN PRESENTED, AND OUR DECISION WAS NOT TO ASK FOR CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF THE DCA. BARBOUR REITERATED THAT DISCUSSION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM IN ANKARA HAD ENCOURAGED US TO BELIEVE THAT THE TURKS WOULD BE FORTHCOMING, ALTHOUGH WE AS YET HAD NO DETAILS. HE ALSO EXPRESSED ONCE AGAIN OUR EXPECTATION THAT THE GOC WOULD TRY TO MODERATE THE ANTICIPATED NEGATIVE
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REACTION IN CYPRUS.

8. IN RESPONSE TO THIS REQUEST FOR RESTRAINT, AMBASSADOR DIMITRIOU STRESSED THAT THE "EMBARGO" HAD LONG BEEN A HIGHLY EMOTIONAL ISSUE IN CYPRUS ON ACCOUNT OF ITS DIRECT RELATIONSHIP TO THE TURKISH INVASION AND CONTINUING OCCUPATION OF THE ISLAND. HE BELIEVED THAT THERE COULD VERY

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9. CYPRUS EMBOFF, SECONDED BY DIMITRIOU, SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IN TERMS OF MODERATING REACTION IN CYPRUS IF TURKS WERE TO MAKE EARLY ANNOUNCEMENT OF THEIR CYPRUS PROPOSALS. THIS WAY THERE WOULD APPEAR TO BE CAUSE-AND-EFFECT RELATIONSHIP AND THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD RETAIN SOME CREDIBILITY. DIMITRIOU ADDED THAT IT WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL IF ADMINISTRATION ANNOUNCEMENT INCLUDED A RESTATEMENT OF OUR CYPRUS COMMITMENT, PERHAPS IN THE FORM OF AN UNDERTAKING TO WORK FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RELEVANT U.N. RESOLUTIONS. BARBOUR SAID THAT WE WOULD LOOK INTO LATTER POSSIBILITY.

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PAGE 01 STATE 084661
ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /016 R

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APPROVED BY: IO/UNA:JFTEFFT

S/S-O:DSUMMERS

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 084661

EXDIS FROM UNA

FOL RPT STATE 084661 TOSEC 030776 SENT ACTION NICOSIA
INFO ANKARA, ATHENS & USDEL SECRETARY DTD 01 APR 78

QUOTE: C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 084661 TOSEC 030176

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGOV, PEPR, CY

SUBJECT:BRIEFING OF CYPRIOT AMBASSADOR ON EASTERN MEDITER-
RANEAN POLICY DECISIONS

REF: BONN 5705

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10. ON A PARTING NOTE, DIMITRIOU SUGGESTED THAT THE SECRETARY MIGHT WANT TO BECOME MORE ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN THE CYPRUS QUESTION IN THE FUTURE. THIS WOULD AMOUNT TO CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF A U.S. COMMITMENT TO WORK FOR A SETTLEMENT. DIMITRIOU CLAIMED THAT THE SECRETARY HAD RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO HOUSE PRESIDENT MICHAELIDES' SUGGESTION, IN THEIR RECENT MEETING, THAT HE INVOLVE HIMSELF MORE DEEPLY. COOPER

UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

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Draft Date: 01 apr 1978
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TAGS: PGOV, PEPR, CY, ZM, US
To: NICOSIA
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